

# HOW THE NORTH CHINA AFFAIR AROSE

THE FOREIGN AFFAIRS ASSOCIATION OF JAPAN

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
HOW THE NORTH CHINA  
AFFAIR AROSE



FROM THE NORTH CHINA  
HARBOUR AREA

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City Wall of Tungchow as it Looked after the Encounter between Japanese and Chinese Troops (Yomiuri photo)




Five Minutes' Massage : Japanese Soldiers at Tientsin (*Asahi photo*)





Japanese Guards at Kuanganmen, Peiping, after the City has been Relieved (July 26) of Chinese Soldiers (Yomiuri photo)






Japanese Telephone Operators at Work at Langfang Station (Yomiuri photo)





Presents for the Troops: A Mountain of Comfort Bags Contributed by All Classes of the People, Piled up at the Japanese War Office (*Asahi photo*)




Street Fighting in Tientsin : The Chinese Almost Captured the Japanese Concession on July 29 (*Asahi photo*)





Cooling off: Japanese Soldiers at the Front Enjoying a Slice of Watermelon (*Asahi photo*)



For the Soldiers in North China: Each Woman Passing in the Streets of Tokyo Contribute One Stitch to the "Senninbari"  
(the Healthbands of a Thousand Stitches), to be Sent to the Japanese Soldiers in North China (*Asahi photo*)



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## HOW THE NORTH CHINA AFFAIR AROSE

### WHY FOREIGN TROOPS IN CHINA?

Peiping, then the capital of China's last monarchical régime and known as Peking, became the focal point of world attention and concern during the Boxer Insurrection of 1900—the now historic uprising of a superstitious Chinese mob, led by reckless champions of anti-foreignism, against the entire community of foreign residents in the city. Worldwide sympathy was evoked by the sufferings and privations of the foreign colony while pent up in the besieged Legation Quarter and which, incidentally, are deftly described in A. Conan Doyle's story "*A Pot of Caviar*." The *finale* of this incident was the conclusion of a treaty by which Britain, America, Belgium, Italy and Japan were empowered to station troops at several places near Peiping and Tientsin for the purposes of safeguarding communications between the capital and the adjacent city port and of protecting their respective Legations and nationals residing in this area. Troops of the respective Powers (except Belgium) have since then been detailed to Peiping, Tientsin, Shanhaikwan, Chinwangtao, Tangku and Tungchichichu and have continued to discharge the duties assigned them by the stipulations in the treaty.

The disorder and periodic upheavals which lack of authority and endless civil wars have caused throughout the whole of China, especially after the fall of the Empire in 1912, have made the maintenance of special means of protection an absolute necessity. Though all recognize that the presence of armed foreign forces in the territory of a friendly State is abnormal, none of the Powers have been able as yet to relinquish this only effective way of securing the safety of their nationals. British, American, Italian and Japanese gunboats steam up the Yangtse River to points 1,500 miles inland. Marines are stationed in all important cities. Only the presence of these warships and



men has safeguarded the homes of foreigners from being robbed and looted and has prevented the foreigners themselves from being murdered in cold blood.

During the years leading up to the establishment of the Government in Nanking, China was a chaos of conflict. Representatives of the Powers who assembled at Washington in 1921 sought by various means to help China put her house in order and expressed the wish, preliminarily to considering the gradual withdrawal of their own armed forces, that the Chinese armies which overran the country be brought under control and reduced to reasonable strength. However, the Nationalist armies themselves were soon to tax foreign patience to the limit. In 1925 fighting reached the outer limits of Shanghai, and to prevent an invasion of the International Settlement itself all foreign troops were stationed at their defense positions.

The shooting of student demonstrators in Shanghai fanned the flames of a fierce anti-British campaign throughout China, with the result that British and American missionaries were killed. In 1927 the war-mad troops attacked foreign residents and "entered Nanking with the definite licence, if not instructions, to rob and kill foreigners."<sup>1</sup>

The concessions in Hankow and Kiukiang were wrested from Britain by force; the Japanese concession in Hankow narrowly escaped a similar fate. Great Britain sent 15,000 troops to Shanghai to protect her interests. Japan sent troops to Tsinan, and she still remembers the atrocities committed by the Nationalist forces on her residents there.

This brief summary adequately explains why all the Powers still have to maintain troops on Chinese soil.

The numerical strength and military equipment of the foreign forces in the Peiping-Tientsin area just before the recent clash are tabulated below:

	Officers	N.C.O. & privates	Total	Machine guns	Cannon	Tanks & Armored Cars
Japan	221	3,859	4,080	173	38	9
U.S.A.	69	1,158	1,227	121	13	2

<sup>1</sup> Extract from a statement concerning the Nanking outrage signed by the Rev. A. J. Bowen, President of Nanking University, and 16 other members of educational institutions and missionaries in China. See also the statement of Sir A. Chamberlain in the House of Commons, March 30, 1927.

Britain	37	962	999	64	10	-
France	65	1,774	1,839	135	26	10
Italy	12	374	384	62	4	4

Japan's military force of 4,080 men shown above gives protection to 16,995 Japanese residents, whereas the combined force of the other Powers, or 4,449 men, to 10,338 non-Japanese foreign residents. Thus Japan's military force in the Peiping-Tientsin area is proportionately smaller than that of the other Powers, and if consideration is given to Japan's material interests in that region which are at stake, the difference is even greater.

The Foreign Legation Quarter in Peiping is the actual seat of the Commanding Staffs and garrisons of the five Powers, but it is out of the question for them to hold maneuvers, which are necessary for the maintenance of their troops' efficiency, inside the walls of the thickly populated city. Consequently all the forces garrisoned in North China have been accustomed to carry on maneuvers without being subjected to any restriction as to time or locality. A southeastern suburb commonly known as Happy Valley is the location used by the American troops for this purpose. To the British and other foreign troops have been allotted suburban districts north of Happy Valley. The Japanese contingent is accustomed to hold exercises on a flat area along one bank of the Yungting River, which flows through the southwestern suburb of Peiping. This area is nearly two miles from the city and was specially chosen because it is sufficiently isolated from the thickly populated districts between the river and the city.

A Chinese garrison is situated in Yuanping, near Lukouchiao, in the vicinity of the so-called Marco Polo Bridge (because the famous traveller mentions the bridge in his narrative, this name has been given by foreigners to the Lukouchiao Bridge); and this fact has in the past occasionally given rise to minor troubles which, however, were amicably settled.

The Notes of July, 1902, exchanged between Japan and China, provide that with the exception of gun practice in which live ammunition is used, no notice need be given for individual maneuvers. However, as a matter of fact, it has been the custom of the Japanese military authorities to serve advance notice on every occasion for the benefit of the local inhabitants.

## THE CLASH AT LUKOUCHIAO

On Wednesday night, July 7th, a small unit of Japanese troops was engaged in maneuvers on their usual grounds in the vicinity of Lukouchiao and Lungwangmiao—villages which stand on the left bank of the Yungting River (see map). With the regular summer inspection but a fortnight ahead, all Japanese troops in the area had been drilling day and night for weeks. The Chinese authorities had been notified of these maneuvers as usual, and nothing untoward had occurred or been anticipated.

But suddenly, at 11:40 o'clock on this particular night, the Japanese troops were fired upon by Chinese soldiers from the directions of Lukouchiao and Lungwangmiao. The Japanese were completely taken by surprise and were utterly unprepared to return the fire, for they were only 150 strong and their supply of live ammunition amounted only to one ball-cartridge per man, which was being kept by the commanding officer. All that they could do at this critical moment was to halt their maneuvers, concentrate at a spot some distance from the Chinese, and send for help to their headquarters, situated about two and a half miles away in the former British barracks at Fengtai. Reinforcements came quickly, and when the Japanese replied to the Chinese fire with real shots, the first clash occurred.

## EFFORTS TO ACHIEVE PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT

The Chinese authorities at Peiping were immediately notified, and a joint Sino-Japanese mediation party hurried to the scene. Before it arrived, however, the Chinese troops at 5:20 a.m. again opened fire. A cessation of hostilities was at last arranged for at 6:00 o'clock on Thursday morning. However, the Chinese soldiers, either in ignorance or in wilful disregard of the terms of the settlement, fired on the Japanese troops, who were forced to protect themselves. So fighting broke out for the second time at 3:00 o'clock in the afternoon, and for the third time at 6:00 o'clock in the evening.

A more definite agreement for maintaining a truce was reached on Friday, July 9th, between Colonel Matsui of the Japanese Special Mission Service at Peiping and the representatives of the 29th Army, according to which the Chinese were to with-

draw to the right bank of the Yungting and the Japanese to remain on the left. Save for spasmodic shots fired by the Chinese soldiery in various localities, this day passed in comparative quiet.

The Chinese troops involved in this affair were a part of the 37th Division, belonging to the 29th Army. This division, under the command of General Feng Chi-an, was composed of remnants of General Feng Yu-hsiang's troops, well-known for their anti-Japanese spirit. In view of the fact that for several months previous the Communists and Blue Shirts had been busily carrying on propaganda for the so-called "Anti-Japanese People's Front," the attitude of these troops was a matter of concern to both the Chinese and Japanese authorities. Accordingly it was with no small relief that the news of a speedy settlement of the affair was received.

On the following day, however, at about 5:00 o'clock in the afternoon approximately 100 Chinese soldiers, in violation of the terms of the truce, appeared with trench mortars 3 miles to the north of Lukouchiao and launched an attack upon the Japanese. At 7:00 o'clock another Chinese contingent of some 100 men marched into the village of Lungwangmiao from a northwesterly direction and there opened fire upon the Japanese, who then launched a counter attack and drove the Chinese from the village. These clashes were ended by an agreement between the authorities of the two sides to suspend hostilities for the night.

The situation seemed quiet for the moment and some members of the Tokyo Government had even left the capital, when, on Saturday afternoon, July 10th, news poured into Tokyo concerning the northward movements of the armies of the Chinese Central Government, the mobilization of air forces in all parts of China, and the proclamation of martial law in the Peiping area. The rapid worsening of the situation causing imminent danger to Japanese lives in North China became apparent.

## DISQUIETING DEVELOPMENTS AND THE TOKYO GOVERNMENT'S STATEMENT

In view of these disquieting developments members of the Cabinet speedily assembled late on July 10th and discussed the question of sending troops to North China in order to forestall



any untoward event that might precipitate a general clash. At the same time, without abandoning the hope of effecting an early settlement, or at least of minimizing the affair, the Government on Sunday morning, July 11th, sent instructions to the authorities on the spot to continue endeavors in this direction. On the basis of these instructions, negotiations were conducted with the Chinese; an agreement was reached on July 11th, and at 4:00 o'clock in the afternoon the Chinese representatives, General Chang Tsu-chung, mayor of Tientsin, and General Ying Yung, chief of the Public Safety Bureau of Hopei, wrote to the Japanese representative, Colonel Matsui, agreeing to the following terms:

- (1) Apology to be made by the representatives of the 29th Army and punishment of those directly responsible.
- (2) Chinese troops to evacuate Lukouchiao and to be replaced by the Peace Preservation Corps for the purpose of keeping the Chinese troops sufficiently separated from the Japanese.
- (3) Adequate measures to be taken for curbing the activities of the Blue Shirts and Communists.

It will be clearly seen that these terms were extremely easy to carry out, having no political or economic significance whatsoever, and that the intention of the unoffending side was to arrive at as rapid and simple a settlement as possible.

Meanwhile, in Tokyo the Japanese Government had been studying measures for coping with the situation. The decision to send necessary forces to North China was reached in view of the alarming news which continued to arrive regarding the provocative actions of the 29th Army soldiers, and the movements of Chinese troops not only in North China but also in South Hopei. The following statement was issued by the Japanese Government at 4:00 p.m. on that day:

The Japanese forces garrisoned in North China have always maintained a calm and patient attitude toward successive anti-Japanese outbreaks in North China. On the night of July 7th an unfortunate clash occurred when the Japanese troops were wantonly fired upon by soldiers of the 29th Army, which had been co-operating with our forces in maintaining peace and order in that region. This led to such an atmosphere of tension in the Peiping and Tientsin districts as to cause deep anxiety for the safety of the lives and property of Japanese nationals. However, the earnest endeavors of the Japanese authorities to localize the affair

and prevent further aggravation succeeded in bringing the 29th Army authorities to agree to a peaceful settlement.

On the night of July 10th, however, soldiers of the 29th Army, in violation of the agreement, suddenly fired upon Japanese troops, causing considerable casualties. The Chinese have since pushed warlike preparations by increasing their forces on the front lines; the troops stationed at Siyuan have advanced to the South, while troops of the Central Government have been moved forward. The Chinese have thus not only failed to evince any sincere desire for a peaceful solution, but have gone the length of flatly rejecting all of Japan's offers for amicable settlement, thus leaving no room for doubt that the present incident is the outcome of a well-organized agitation for warlike action against Japan.

There is no need of stressing the vital importance to Japan and Manchoukuo of the maintenance of peace and order in North China. What is most urgently needed for the peace of East Asia is that the Chinese not only apologize for their most recent lawless actions and manifestations of antagonism to Japan, but give adequate guarantee against a recurrence of such outrages in the future. An important decision has been reached by the Japanese Government at today's Cabinet meeting to take all necessary measures for dispatching military forces to North China.

But, desirous as ever of preserving the peace of East Asia, the Japanese Government has not abandoned its hope that negotiations may yet assure the non-aggravation of the situation, and that prompt reconsideration on the part of China may bring about an amicable solution. The Japanese Government is, of course, prepared to give full consideration to the safeguarding of the rights and interests of the Powers in China.

#### CONSIDERATIONS PROMPTING THE DISPATCH OF TROOPS

The announcement that troops were to be dispatched to North China was not intended to frighten China into submission, nor did it mean that Japan was embarking upon a war with her neighbor. The action taken by the Japanese Government was entirely in keeping with its avowed intention not to aggravate the situation; it was calculated to forestall any conflict which would inevitably lead to hostilities on a major scale. In the face of repeated failures on the part of the Chinese to carry out their promises, and especially in the light of past experiences with excited, uncontrolled and uncontrollable Chinese soldiery, the task of protecting the lives and property of large numbers of Japanese nationals in the affected areas requires more numerical

strength than the garrison troops now stationed there can afford. The Nanking incident of 10 years ago mentioned above is but one illustration of what defenseless foreigners may have to suffer at the hands of undisciplined Chinese troops. Memory of the 189 houses looted, of the men, women and children tortured, defiled and killed when the Nationalist troops occupied Tsinan in 1927, is still fresh in the mind of the Japanese nation. The Japanese garrison troops in North China would be heavily outnumbered if they were attacked by the troops of the 29th Army, which is stationed in and around the Peiping and Tientsin districts. Should such eventualities occur, all hopes would be lost for an early and amicable settlement of the problem. Moreover, the fact should not be overlooked that the rank and file of the 29th Army, which consists of the remnants of Feng Yu-hsiang's once-famous "National Armies," have always been notoriously anti-Japanese, the more so of late since they have been tutored in the teachings of the Communists. It was thus more than doubtful whether they could be held in leash.

In fact, only a few hours after an agreement for a truce had been reached, a Japanese staff officer sent to treat with the Chinese troops at Lukouchiao was fired upon. Later, the Chinese troops stationed at Yamenkou advanced upon Lungwang-miao, the village that was to be evacuated. And during the night Chinese troops were violently firing at each other across the Yungting River, each group in the belief that the others were Japanese.

#### NANKING BLAMES JAPAN

No sooner had the present incident arisen than the Nanking authorities embarked upon a vigorous campaign of propaganda, both at home and abroad, accusing Japan of impairing China's sovereignty and conducting a war of conquest.

According to official Chinese information, it would appear that the Japanese troops were illegally stationed in North China, that their holding of maneuvers constituted an encroachment on Chinese territorial integrity and, moreover, that the Lukouchiao affair had been engineered by Japanese military authorities who had ulterior motives such as, for instance, the occupation of that village to control the Peiping-Hankow Railway.

In support of this contention a story was circulated to the effect that it was the Japanese soldiers who fired at Chinese sentinels while the latter were looking for a missing comrade and that the Japanese tried to force their way into the village of Lukouchiao. This is a plausible falsehood that might be taken for the truth by those who are unacquainted with the actual circumstances and the topography of the village in question. Let us establish the facts. In the first place, Lukouchiao, being always jealously guarded by Chinese, is a village which Japanese soldiers had been instructed not to enter. In the second place, in order to approach the village gate from the field of maneuvers it is necessary twice to cross the railway track on a high embankment. It is utterly inconceivable that any Japanese soldier, even if he became lost in the familiar tract of land, should have ever wandered over and across those steep railway tracks into the village against the strict warnings of his superiors, and unnecessarily court danger in the middle of the night.

Again, even assuming that the affair had been planned by the Japanese military, would they have chosen that particular method of relying upon a handful of men equipped with one ball-cartridge per head?—or would they have chosen that particular spot which is vastly advantageous to the Chinese occupying the hills on the western side?—or, in view of the large military movements which such a *coup* would involve, would they have chosen the particular night when the commander of the Tientsin garrison lay ill and was on the verge of death, and when the officer next in command was absent from his post, having departed on an inspection tour to Shanhaikwan? Finally, if they had really wanted to hold the railway, would they have proposed the withdrawal of troops from Lukouchiao and promptly put their proposal into practice? Would they in any case have provoked large scale operations when they were surrounded by 8,000 Chinese troops and when their own troops, consisting only of the garrisons distributed over the Peiping-Tientsin area, were at a disadvantage of more than 10 to 1?

A tentative answer to the above questions is furnished by the opinion of a neutral and experienced observer, the Peiping correspondent of *The Times* (London), whose report of July 8th appeared under the heading, "Fighting near Peiping: Japanese and Chinese Clash," on page 15 of the issue of July 9th.



This was in part as follows :

The Chinese lay the blame for the situation on the widespread Japanese field exercises which have been proceeding during the last few days. The trouble seems to have started when Chinese troops mistook a sham attack on Marco Polo Bridge near Wanping for a real one.

#### GENERAL SUNG CHE-YUAN RETURNS TO TIENTSIN

On July 13th General Sung Che-yuan, chairman of the Hopei-Chahar Political Council, returned to Tientsin from the country resort where he had been staying, and took up the negotiations on the spot with Lieutenant-General Katsuki, newly-appointed commander of the Tientsin garrison in place of General Tashiro, who had been confined to bed, owing to serious illness, for over a month.

However, the prevailing *état d'esprit* of the 29th Army was still a cause of anxiety ; minor clashes were occurring as frequently as before, although the Japanese authorities were exercising the greatest patience, instructing their men not to retaliate for the wrongs done by Chinese soldiers save in unavoidable cases.

Despite the Chinese promise to lift martial law, release the Japanese held in detention, and restore communications between Peiping and Tientsin, the city of Peiping on the morning of July 13th was plastered with anti-Japanese posters and seethed with demonstrations against Japan. On the same day, 4 Japanese motor lorries were fired upon near Yungtingmen ; the next day 1 soldier of a cavalry unit was shot to death while passing south of Nanyuan ; on the 16th a detachment on its way to Tungchow was fired upon by a band of Chinese police, who had to be disarmed ; on the 19th the Chinese fired on the guards at Lukouchiao, severely wounding the commanding officer, Captain Yamazaki.

In the meanwhile, anti-Japanese movements were spreading rapidly in other parts of China. New anti-Japanese organizations were being formed in the city of Nanking, such as the "Fight-Enemy-Fight-Japan Society ;" and at Canton the authorities issued a circular telegram pressing the Central Government to dispatch more troops to North China.

#### NANKING REFUSES TO RECOGNIZE ANY LOCAL SETTLEMENT

On July 12th Mr. S. Hidaka, counsellor of the Japanese Em-

bassy at Nanking, seeing that matters were on a fair way to a settlement in North China, visited the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mr. Wang Ching-hui, and urged that the Nanking Government not obstruct the execution of the settlement. He reiterated this advice 2 days later to another Chinese official, but Nanking refused to listen, declaring that it would not recognize any local arrangement and issued orders for the mobilization of more troops. Gravely concerned over the growing tension caused by this attitude, which only served to delay the execution of the agreement and might lead to serious consequences on the spot, the Japanese Government decided formally to approach the Nanking authorities.

Late in the night of July 17th Mr. Hidaka again called on the Chinese Foreign Minister and handed him a memorandum in which the Japanese Government urged the Nanking Government not to interfere with the execution of the agreement arrived at on the spot and to suspend immediately all military movements against Japan. The Chinese Foreign Minister told Mr. Hidaka that he would be able to reply by Monday, July 19th.

The next day, July 18th, at 1:00 p.m. in pursuance of the agreed terms, General Sung Che-yuan expressed to General Katsuki his regrets concerning the Lukouchiao incident. The first step seemed thus to have been taken toward a settlement of the affair.


However, the attitude of the officers and men of the 37th Division remained still uncertain. It would doubtless be influenced to a great extent by whether or not Nanking would encourage them to resist a settlement.

#### CHIANG KAI-SHEK DEFINES CHINA'S 4 POINTS

Meanwhile, on the same day General Chiang Kai-shek made a lengthy statement to educational and technical leaders of China then gathered at Kuling, setting forth "the minimum conditions acceptable to China for the settlement of the North China crisis."

The conditions were (1) that any kind of settlement must not infringe upon the territorial and sovereign rights of China ; (2) that the status of the Hopei-Chahar Political Council is fixed by the Central Government of China and there must not be

## POINTS OF DIFFERENCE



The North China Daily News, July 26]

[Shanghai

any alterations made; (3) that the Central Government will not agree to the removal of those local officials it has appointed, such as the Chairman of the Hopei-Chahar Political Council; and (4) that the Central Government will not allow any restrictions to be placed upon the disposition of the 29th Army.

"All that," the American owned *Japan Advertiser* commented editorially, "is rhetoric and as far from the reality of the present situation as the Lytton Report's recommendations were from the reality of the Manchurian situation."

### NANKING'S REPLY EVADES THE ISSUE

Thus it was with considerable anxiety that the Chinese reply was awaited in Tokyo.

At 2:30 p.m., July 19th, Mr. Tung Tao-ning, chief of the first section of the Asiatic Bureau, by order of the Foreign Minister of the Nanking Government, called on Mr. Hidaka at the latter's office and handed him an *aide mémoire* after reading it aloud.

In this document it was declared that the movements of Chinese troops were a measure of defense and the following was submitted:

(1) The two Governments to agree upon a date for both sides simultaneously to stop the movements of their troops and also to recall their armed forces to their original stations.

(2) They should enter into diplomatic negotiations with a view to reaching an immediate settlement.

(3) The authorization of the Central Government is necessary for any agreement to be made on the spot concerning any question, even of a local character.

(4) The Chinese Government is willing to accept any means of settlement recognized by international law or treaties, such as direct negotiations, good offices, mediation or arbitration.

Mr. Hidaka, after asking a few questions concerning the memorandum and expressing his disappointment at its contents, told Mr. Tung that he would accept it as a reply from Foreign Minister Wang; but that, if it was not, he would expect to hear again from Mr. Wang within the day.

In official circles in Tokyo, the Chinese memorandum brought forth the comments, published in the morning papers of July 20th, that Nanking's memorandum evaded both points put forward in the Japanese memorandum of July 17th.

The direct cause of the affair, it was recalled, was the firing on Japanese troops during their night maneuvers by Chinese forces of the 37th Division from Lukouchiao and Lungwang-miao. For Japan to agree to simultaneous withdrawal, which would imply partial responsibility of the Japanese, was out of the question, particularly in view of the fact that, although Japan had taken immediate steps in order to obtain a speedy settlement, the agreements subsequently arrived at for the suspension of hostilities and withdrawal of troops were broken by the Chinese, including even the written understanding made by their representatives on July 11th. In fact it had not been possible for these reasons seriously to entertain a similar proposal submitted by Nanking on July 12th.

As to the contention that the Chinese troops movements were defensive measures, it was pointed out that this was absurd: the Japanese decision to send troops to North China was in itself caused by the heavy concentration in, and transportation to, North China of Central Government troops, beginning on July 9th. There were in the Peiping-Tientsin region over 80,000 men of the 29th Army: more than 25 divisions were massed along the railway lines leading to these cities and were



being shifted to the North, some troops being barely one hour's distance from Peiping. Meanwhile, Japan was manifesting great restraint, even in face of the peril threatening her nationals and her relatively small garrison in North China. The Japanese reinforcements were as yet standing by, since only small contingents had been sent to China from Manchuria, but none as yet from Japan.

Furthermore, it was pointed out that the Nanking Government had recognized the establishment of the Hopei-Chahar Political Council, a unique régime wielding wide powers, and had not interfered heretofore when it entered into local agreements on its own responsibility. There was no reason for claiming at the present moment that all local agreements must have Nanking's sanction which thus meant nothing but obstruction of a speedy settlement.

The attitude of the Nanking Government as revealed by its reply was extremely disappointing to the Japanese Government which had endeavored to enlist Nanking's co-operation toward bringing about an amicable settlement at an early date.

Already there had been deliberate delay in sending a large force over the sea (as strategical considerations would have demanded), because it was hoped that such measures would not prove absolutely necessary.

A further delay now would be procrastination and be fraught with increasing danger both to Japanese citizens and to Japanese troops.

Accordingly on July 19th, at 10:00 p.m., the headquarters of the Japanese garrison at Tientsin announced that they would be compelled to take the action which they deemed appropriate in coping with the situation on and after July 20th, unless the Chinese immediately ceased their provocative actions.

## THE SECOND PHASE: CHINA PRECIPITATES THE CRISIS

### NEW PROMISES MADE BY CHINESE GARRISON

The warning issued the previous day by the Tientsin garrison was apparently unheeded, for at 2:00 p.m., July 20th, the Chinese troops at Lukouchiao again opened fire and the Chinese machine gun unit at Papaoshan began advancing on the Japanese position. The Japanese, acting on the declaration issued on the 19th, retorted with field and machine guns and eventually silenced the Chinese.

Upon representations made by the Japanese commander, General Sung Che-yuan renewed the pledge that he would cause the 37th Division under General Feng Chi-an stationed at Yamenkou and Papaoshan to be withdrawn toward the rear by the noon of the 21st and replaced by the Peace Preservation Corps under General Shih Yu-san. He further made it known that he would on his own responsibility see to it that the incident was localized and the Japanese residents duly protected. The Japanese commander resolved to abstain from positive actions and wait to see if he (General Sung) would live up to his word.

On the other hand the Nanking Government, which apparently places great faith in its aerial force, had assembled nearly 350 planes at Loyang and Hsuehou, and a portion of this force was starting joint operations with the Chinese troops in Hopei. A squad of 30 planes forming part of their reserve aerial force was also ordered to stand by.

Preparations were being pushed forward on July 21st. At 11:00 a.m. Chiang Kai-shek summoned the Army leaders to his residence in the Military School and discussed ways and means to provide against the possibility of an all-round encounter with Japan, the distribution of personnel connected with the direction of troops in Middle, South and North China, and General Staff affairs.

As to the disposition of the Chinese troops in the field of

immediate concern to the Japanese, the 29th Army near Yamenkou had evacuated their quarters but not those at and near Lukou-chiao, thus defaulting on their agreement. As a result of further parley, General Sung promised to evacuate his troops by 8:00 p. m., and on July 22nd the troops under General Feng Chi-an stationed within the walls of Peiping began to withdraw in the direction of Paoting.

However, a minor event again set back the favorable trend of affairs on July 23rd, when at Chiang Kai-shek's command General Hsiung Pin, assistant chief of the Chinese General Staff, arrived by plane at Paoting from Nanking, then made his way to Peiping which he reached toward dusk. This was duly known to the Chinese troops, who interpreted the arrival of such an important messenger as an encouragement to resist. Contrary to General Sung's agreement, the main body of the 37th Division was still staying at Siyuan; so the Peace Preservation Corps under General Shih Yu-san built military positions at Papaoshan on July 24th. The Chinese forces at Peiping were still showing no sign of evacuating and would not move even a single train on the pretext that there was not sufficient rolling stock, while the 27th Regiment under Chao Teng-chang attached to the 132nd Division entered Peiping in flagrant violation of their agreement.

The Japanese authorities had placed full faith in Generals Sung Che-yuan and Chang Tsu-chung to do their utmost in striving to settle the matter peacefully and locally. On July 25th, in reply to a question asked by Japanese newspapermen, Commander Katsuki of the Tientsin garrison even went so far as to tell them confidentially that he believed there would be no necessity for his troops to fight the 29th Army.

However, two incidents occurred which dashed these hopes to the ground.

The Japanese military telephone line between Peiping and Tientsin had been repeatedly cut by the Chinese from about July 19th. On July 25th it was found that the line had been severed again near Langfang, a small railway station midway between the two cities.

A Japanese unit was sent to make the necessary repairs with the understanding of General Chang Tsu-chung, commander of the 38th Division.

At 4:20 p.m. a detachment of engineers, under the protec-

tion of a company of soldiers, arrived at Langfang, where they found the railway station occupied by a detachment of soldiers belonging to the 38th Division. After some parleying, the Japanese secured the latter's consent to enter the station. They were further delayed by difficulty in obtaining lodgings for the night from the Public Safety Bureau. However, the work was finally completed and around 11:00 p.m., with their rifles stacked, the men were taking supper within the station compound. The Langfang station presented a scene of perfect peace. There were absolutely no indications that within a few minutes it would be converted into a scene of fierce battle between the Chinese and Japanese forces.

At 11:10 the Chinese launched their attack against the Japanese. Rifles, hand grenades, and machine guns were brought into play. The Japanese, taken by surprise, at once picked up their arms and fired back in the darkness.

Nearly a full regiment of Tsui Chen-hui's infantry was garrisoned at a point north of Langfang, and these troops, upon hearing the sound of the firing, entered the fray with trench mortars. The Japanese, outnumbered by the Chinese, asked for reinforcements. These could not be rushed up soon enough to rescue the besieged men. So on the next morning at 7:00 o'clock a number of planes flew to the scene and bombed the Chinese barracks, thus saving the Japanese from annihilation. The Chinese troops were finally driven away in the direction of Huangtsun, but the pursuit was not pushed further.

#### GENERAL KATSUKI DELIVERS A STRONG NOTE

This affray showed that it was impossible to rely on the pledges made by the Chinese, whose troops and officers were getting out of hand, and the hesitation of their leaders had to be overcome. So General Katsuki decided to send a formal note, a virtual ultimatum, to General Sung, embodying the points already accepted. This note was delivered at 3:30 p. m. by Col. T. Matsui at Peiping. General Katsuki pointed out that the fresh outbreak at Langfang had been started by lawless Chinese firing on the Japanese unit sent there to protect communications. Voicing regret at the occurrence of another armed clash, he blamed it entirely on the failure of the 29th Army to carry out



the terms of the agreement concluded with the Japanese authorities and also on that army's maintenance of a provocative attitude.

If the 29th Army authorities still intend to prevent aggravation of the situation, he demanded that they demonstrate it by promptly effecting complete evacuation of the entire Peiping area by the 37th Division.


The note specified that the troops of the 37th Division near Lukouchiao and Papaoshan be withdrawn "by noon tomorrow" to Changsintien, south of Lukouchiao, on the Peiping-Hankow Railway; that all troops of the same division immediately leave the walled city of Peiping, and that these troops, together with those of the 37th Division stationed at Siyuan, a short distance northwest of Peiping, be moved from the area north of the Peiping-Hankow Railway to the west bank of the Yungting River by Wednesday noon, July 28th.

Specifying further that all these troops must be withdrawn promptly to the Paoting area, 90 miles south of Peiping on the Peiping-Hankow Railway, General Katsuki sternly warned that, should the Chinese fail to carry out the demand, the Japanese Army would be "compelled to conclude that the 29th Army's authorities lack sincerity and to take any action it may deem appropriate." In that event the 29th Army must take full responsibility for anything that might happen.

In the wake of the Langfang affair, another proof of Chinese animosity and treachery occurred a few hours later, at 6:00 o'clock in the afternoon. In view of the disquieting situation in Peiping, it had been decided that a detachment of the forces stationed at Fengtai should be sent to Peiping, with the object of providing better protection for the Japanese residents. An understanding had already been reached with the Chinese garrison concerning the matter and these soldiers, riding in a number of trucks, arrived at 4:00 p. m. at Kuanganmen, one of the wall gates of Peiping, on their way to the Japanese barracks. The Chinese soldiers on guard there, however, would not unlock the gates. At 6:00 o'clock, parleying was still in progress. Lt.-Col. Sakurai, adviser to the 29th Army, came to the spot, accompanied by newspapermen. At 7:35 p. m. the gates were partially opened and the Japanese began to enter the city.

Some explanation about town gates in China must be given to make the subsequent events clear. The town wall in China,

as a rule, is a double wall where a passage is provided, and there are an outer and an inner gates, as shown in the accompanying sketch. To enter the town, both gates must be negotiated. They may be in line or at right angles to each other.



As the file of trucks lumbered through the heavy gates, resentful Chinese soldiers watched from atop the walls and elsewhere. Five, ten, twenty trucks had rumbled by, when suddenly the inner portals were swung to. The first of the trapped trucks had not even stopped before a hail of bullets was directed on it. The men on the following trucks jumped from the vehicles, as the outer gate shut behind them. Machine guns spat death, hand grenades exploded. The soldiers on the trucks stranded outside the city and those who had already gone through, hesitated, bewildered, then spread to cover and began returning the fire which rained from the walls. The trapped men made a desperate effort to escape, forced open a gate and rejoined their comrades, leaving 3 dead behind them. Under the cover of darkness two newspapermen and a newsreel man were carried to safety, seriously wounded.

#### JAPAN DECIDES TO ORDER OUT REINFORCEMENTS

The frequent occurrence of treacherous action such as that just cited—so indicative of the aggressive attitude of the Chinese—was not only disquieting to the Japanese at the front but also showed the danger to public opinion in Japan. The Government, keenly alive to the situation as one calling for defensive action to an increasing extent, held a Cabinet meeting at 1:30 p. m. on the 27th and as a result presented for Imperial sanction an order mobilizing reinforcements to be sent to China. It issued the same day, through the Chief Secretary, an important declaration stating its position.

Voicing Japan's grave concern over the maintenance of peace and order in North China, the statement pointed out that the consistent policy of anti-Japanism pursued by the Chinese side had repeatedly menaced peace in North China.

It went on to say that in accordance with its policy not to aggravate the North China situation and to seek a local settlement of the affair for the sake of peace in East Asia, Japan had been making every effort to dispose of the situation peacefully.

Japan had submitted very lenient demands to the authorities of the Hopei-Chahar Political Council and, though they had recognized them at the time, they had failed to show good faith in carrying out the conditions. On the other hand the Japanese Government had called the attention of the Nanking Government on July 17th to the necessity of immediately suspending provocative speech and actions and of not obstructing the efforts for a local settlement of the issue. Disregarding the actual conditions, the Nanking Government did not comply with the Japanese Government's contentions. Continues the statement :

On the contrary, the Nanking Government strengthened its preparations for war, thus increasing unrest. While Japan was making efforts towards a peaceful solution of the situation with patience and self-restraint, the Chinese side perpetrated acts which can only render these efforts meaningless. The Chinese troops illegally fired on the Japanese at Langfang on July 26th and on the same evening the Chinese side committed unwarranted violence at Kuanganmen.

These two cases constitute armed obstruction on the part of the Chinese troops of the original duties of the Japanese North China garrison which are to safeguard the communication lines between Peiping and Tientsin and to protect Japanese nationals resident in the area.

Thus the Japanese Army has been forced to take defensive actions necessary for the execution of its duties and also for the securing of the carrying out of the terms of the agreement concluded between Japan and the Hopei-Chahar Political Council. The aim of the Japanese Government is to eradicate the fundamental causes for the outbreak of untoward incidents like the present one. Japan does not entertain enmity toward the Chinese people. Neither has Japan any territorial designs. It goes without saying that Japan will make every effort to protect the vested rights and interests of the foreign Powers in China.

Although the situation has come to such a pass, Japan, whose mission is to secure peace in East Asia, desires that the Chinese side will reflect on its stand by minimizing the situation to the smallest possible extent and by co-operating toward immediate and amicable settlement of the incident.

#### NANKING BELATEDLY APPROVES THE LOCAL TERMS OF SETTLEMENT

However, in Nanking the Foreign Ministry issued on the night of the 27th, at 10:30 o'clock, a statement which declared in part that the Japanese had worked out with the Chinese local authorities an emergency form of settlement to which the Central Government, finding it not so divergent from its established policy, had been generous enough to take no exception. Unfortunately this last minute approval of the local settlement which Nanking had up to then obstructed, came too late. The Chinese Government's previous attitude had already borne its fruit. Had the Chinese Government been willing from the outset to consider reaching an agreement on the spot, as the Japanese authorities had striven to do, the whole affair would have been localized and, as such, would have blown over without engendering today's crisis.

But the commander on the spot, responsible for the safety of 18,000 Japanese civilians, faced a most serious situation which Nanking's belated words could not alleviate. The restlessness of the 37th Division had spread to General Chang Tsu-jung's forces, the 28th Division. Not only were the Chinese troops not preparing to execute the promised withdrawal, but on the contrary some were strengthening their positions and preparing to attack. The situation was becoming more and more serious. It demanded swift and drastic action. Only the forcible eviction of the 29th Army could now solve matters. During the night of July 27th to 28th General Katsuki informed General Feng and the Mayor of Peiping of his decision. At 5 a. m., July 28th, the Japanese troops began their march toward the Chinese lines.

General Katsuki, in a statement published at that time, declared that what had brought about the crisis was the serious and unpardonable breach of faith committed by China in rushing northward a formidable number of Central Army troops in outright violation of the Ho-Umezu Agreement and in steadily preparing for action against the Japanese.

In consequence peace and order in North China had now been completely disrupted and the lives and property of the Japanese residents were exposed to imminent danger. The maintenance of peace and order in North China was a matter of



serious concern to both Japan and Manchoukuo, but every means for a peaceful settlement of the present complications had now been exhausted.

He stressed the fact that the punitive action to be undertaken was aimed solely at those Chinese forces which had been persistently challenging the Japanese troops and that it was in no way directed towards the 100 million Chinese population in North China. The speedy restoration of peace and order in North China was desired in the hope of promoting the welfare of the people in this part of China. He also made it clear that the Japanese troops had no intention of using force inside the walled city of Peiping unless the Chinese troops remaining there should try to challenge them. And he promised, recognizing the rights and interests of foreign nationals in China, to try his best to accord adequate protection to their lives and property. He also took this opportunity to affirm that the Japanese Army entertained absolutely no territorial designs on North China.

Despite a prevailing heavy rain and storm, the Japanese air force was called out and early that same morning the Chinese barracks at Siyuan were bombed. The land forces went on disposing of the Chinese troops at Shanhsuchen, Chinghochon, Nanyuan, Matsun, Yamenkou, Papaoshan, and Lukouchiao so that by 4:00 p.m. in the afternoon of the 29th all of the Chinese troops had been expelled from Peiping.


The position of General Sung Che-yuan, commander of the 29th Army, and General Chin Teh-chun, mayor of the city of Peiping, had become so untenable that with General Feng Chi-an, commander of the 37th Division, they secretly fled to Paoting on July 28th.

Pursuing their mopping up operations, the main Japanese force occupied a strategic point to the south of Peiping, near Changsintien, on the 30th; to the north the Suzuki unit successfully disarmed the Chinese forces at Peiyuan.

#### THE 29TH ARMY ATTACKS TIENSIN

But whilst the Japanese forces were busy near the ancient capital, new and alarming developments had cropped up Tientsin. This densely populated city, an international center of business, is built on the banks of the White River,

the Peiho. On its left bank, from east to west, lie the ex-German Concession, taken over by the Chinese and called the First Special District; the British Concession; the French Concession, which commands the International Bridge, sole way of crossing from the Concessions' quarter to the other part of the city; then the Japanese Concession and the native city. From this part another bridge crosses the river. On the right bank, facing the British and French Concessions are the ex-Belgian and Russian Concessions (Third and Second Special Districts), and facing the Japanese Concession is the Italian Concession, bordered by the ex-Austrian Concession. Beyond runs the railway line. The principal station, the East Station, lies straight ahead of the International Bridge.



In the Notes exchanged between China and Japan in 1902 with regard to the retrocession of Tientsin, it is set forth that the Chinese Government shall not move or station its troops within 20 Chinese miles of the foreign garrisons stationed in Tientsin, but of this treaty obligation the Chinese troops were taking no heed.

At 2:00 o'clock in the morning of July 29th, soldiers of the 29th Army with the aid of the Chinese Peace Preservation Corps launched a surprise attack on four important points, the Japanese barracks, the Concession, the East Station, and the Japanese field. In the dark from the north and the west Chinese soldiers silently crept toward the Concession. Another force advanced

from the south along the road leading to the Japanese barracks. In these remained only a single company of artillery. In the concession another company of infantry was on duty. The Chinese had approached to within 30 yards of the artillery depot when the sentries discovered them. The alarm was raised; guns were hurriedly trained on the advancing mass, and shrapnel was fired point blank. At the concession gate a handful of policemen held the enemy at bay. At the aerodrome the fire of the sentries checked the surging waves of Chinese soldiers. But they soon surrounded the field, cutting it off from the city. And at the East Station a small group of Japanese soldiers, surprised by the attack, fell back but soon regained control. They too, however, were cut off from the city, but desperately clung to their positions.

#### PLANES TO THE RESCUE

At the same time spear-head thrusts were being made at Langfang and other points of the Peiping-Tientsin Railway in order to sever the Japanese communication lines.

Trench mortars and small artillery had come into action and shells began to fall in the foreign concessions. Japanese reinforcements were hurriedly summoned and by severe hand-to-hand fighting the Chinese were kept at bay. From the surrounded flying-field planes happily could leave and land; they reconnoitered, dropping reports of the situation. Fresh Chinese troops were seen assembling at their rallying places in the Chinese city, the municipal office, the Peace Preservation Corps Headquarters, and the Nankai University buildings. The pressure was becoming unbearable.

So at 2:30 p.m. planes were ordered out to bomb the Chinese headquarters. By this time the civilian population in the fighting area had fled and the danger of causing civilian casualties was small. The Japanese planes picked their objectives and did an efficient job on the big buildings, but spared the small civilian houses.

By 7:00 p.m. the peril had been practically warded off. But under the cover of night the Chinese reassembled. On the morning of July 30th Japanese planes were again sent out. Hampered by the impossibility of sending troops through the foreign con-

cessions and thus using the International Bridge which springs from the French Concession, the Japanese built a pontoon bridge across the river.

At noon the Japanese had the situation in hand, but meanwhile were slowly sustaining heavy losses while driving the Chinese away from the city. Tientsin had escaped the horrors of a fate which even then was befalling a nearby city, Tungchow.

#### THE TUNGCHOW MASSACRE

The walled city of Tungchow is situated 6 miles east of Peiping on the limit of the demilitarized zone established by the Tangku agreement in 1932. It is the principal city of that area and the seat of the East Hopei Administration. In accordance with the provisions of the Tangku truce agreement no regular Chinese troops were to be stationed in East Hopei, and Yin Ju-keng, head of the Administration, had organized a Peace Preservation Corps, a sort of military police armed with rifles and light machine guns.

In the beginning lawless elements had overrun the country and Japanese troops had been actively co-operating with the Peace Preservation Corps to reestablish order, but of late things had quietened down. In Tungchow itself a Japanese garrison had been stationed. In the city were garrisoned 1,000 Peace Preservation troops. The Japanese and Korean population at the end of June amounted to 151 Japanese and 187 Koreans, and during the disturbances about 50 refugees came from Peiping. Army troops of the 29th independent brigade of the 29th Army had been allowed to stay in the outskirts of the city.

As the situation in North China became serious and the troops of the Japanese garrison were sent out to the Peiping area, agitation began to spread among the Chinese soldiers, who attempted to gain the aid of the Peace Preservation troops; and as matters became worse, officers from the headquarters of the 37th Division secretly came to Tungchow to incite them to join in a widespread movement against the Japanese. The attitude of the regulars became more and more bellicose, and on the 27th they were disarmed with the help of the Peace Preservation Corps. Quiet apparently returned.

But suddenly at about 3:00 a.m., July 29th, just at the time the



Chinese were attacking the Japanese Concession in Tientsin and trying to sever the Peiping-Tientsin Railway line, 2,000 men of the 29th Army who had covertly gathered around Tungchow, helped by a part of the Peace Preservation Corps, launched a surprise assault on the principal Japanese buildings of Tungchow, the Japanese garrison, the Japanese Army's special service mission and the Kinsuiro, a Japanese managed hotel. In this attack they were joined by some 1,000 men of the Peace Preservation Corps, whom they had successfully instigated to join the raid. All the attacks were obviously premeditated and carried out in accordance with carefully laid plans.

Those who attacked the garrison killed a sentinel before he had time to sound an alarm, but the Japanese troops, then only 120 strong, promptly took up their positions to defend the barracks as soon as they realized an attack was being made. The Chinese fired intensively from the southern side of the barracks. The Japanese returned the fire and held out until dawn, when the Chinese opened fire with machine guns and trench mortars from the top of the town wall.

Fire broke out in the barracks when tins of gasoline and cases of munitions loaded on 15 trucks ready to leave for Peiping were hit during the bombardment. The munitions cases began to explode one by one, and no Chinese dared to approach the barracks as the splinters of the cases flew in all directions with terrific force.

As soon as news of the attack reached Peiping, orders were sent for the rescue of the besieged. But the Japanese troops were rounding up the remnants of the 37th Division near Peiping, while others were hurrying towards Tientsin.

About 2:00 o'clock Friday afternoon, July 30th, a Japanese warplane arrived to help the Japanese. The Chinese attack subsequently lessened in intensity, but the fire at the barracks could not be brought under control. On July 31st, despite rain, Japanese planes flew over the scene and bombed the Chinese, who abandoned the siege and retreated to the north.

It was not until 4:20 p.m. of the same day that a unit from the Kawabé detachment, which had been fighting to the south of Peiping, could arrive on the spot. It immediately took possession of five gates in the wall and then quickly mopped up the Chinese soldiers. Calm again prevailed.

When the Japanese troops arrived, they found that all Japanese homes not only had been ransacked, but also their occupants tortured and killed. And while they were masters of the city, the Chinese troops had also thoroughly looted the Chinese houses, restaurants, etc.

The massacre of the Japanese by the Chinese troops seems to have been prepared carefully, and all available evidence tends to indicate that they had ascertained beforehand the homes of Japanese residents. As soon as the attack started, small groups of soldiers broke into every Japanese residence, butchering the occupants with rifles and swords and making a thorough search, even tearing up the floors and ceilings.

Panic-stricken children were seized and brutally killed by having their heads twisted off or being beaten or hurled to the ground. All the women who met death were shot while offering desperate resistance, and their bodies were mutilated and mangled with swords.

An official report states that the maid servants of the Kinsuiro were strung together by wire pierced through their noses or throats and taken to be shot; and after being subjected to unspeakable outrages, their bodies were thrown into a lotus pond near the East Gate.

It was ascertained on August 4th that 77 Japanese and 58 Koreans, who had fled to the Japanese barracks, were safe. One hundred and fifty bodies had been recovered by that date. Later a few survivors, who had been given refuge by Chinese friends or servants, were discovered. The toll of civilian men, women and children tortured and killed exceeded 200.

## THE PROBLEM OF NORTH CHINA

### WHAT FRUSTRATED A SPEEDY SETTLEMENT

Having followed the sequence of events in North China, it may be well to consider the causes of the present situation and see what hope can be held for the future.

As to the initial incident, the Lukouchiao affair, it has been established that the firing, whether accidental or not, began on the Chinese side. Both the *Manchester Guardian* and the *Journal de Genève*, in their leading articles of July 19th and July 29th respectively, accept this fact as true.

Why then has the situation become aggravated to the point it has reached today in spite of Japan's earnest efforts to localize the incident and speedily attain a peaceful settlement? Both in Tokyo and on the spot moderation and restraint were exercised to the utmost. Troop embarkment was delayed to the limit; the most lenient terms of settlement were proffered in order to obtain a speedy solution; and orders were given to the troops not to retaliate against provocation nor return fire, in order to avoid causing new incidents during the withdrawal of the Chinese troops to their agreed positions. In spite of this, new clashes occurred, warlike operations spread, Japanese men, women and children were massacred, and Chinese and Japanese forces began preparations for a major struggle. Why?

Concerning the recurrence of clashes, it is to be deplored that the leaders of the 29th Army lacked the authority to assure that their men observed the terms of the agreement made with the Japanese. It is not certain whether this was due to the absence of discipline on the part of the Chinese troops or to the fact that the ranks deliberately ignored orders from their superiors. But since the Chinese soldiers are very apt to turn aggressive in the presence of a force numerically inferior, it is as likely as not that the ranks were responsible for the recent occurrence. As an example, it may be mentioned that when a Japanese infantry force was passing through the neighborhood of Matsun to the south of Peiping on the 23rd, and again, when a Japanese

cavalry force was proceeding through Tuanho village on the following day, they were attacked by Chinese soldiers and suffered losses of some men. In each of these instances the attack was made on the small force guarding the rear after the passage of the main body, damage incurred by the Japanese being considerable each time. The occurrences at Langfang and Kuan-ganmen were of the same complexion.

The constant anti-Japanese agitation to which the Chinese troops were subjected may also be given as a reason for such an aggressive attitude. It is said that even in peace times the Chinese soldiers at drill keep step to the words, "Ta-tao Jih-pen," or "Down with Japan," instead of one, two, three, four. Can it be wondered that the soldiers, trained in such a fashion, should assume aggressive attitude upon the slightest pretext?

### HEAVY TROOP MOVEMENTS RASHLY ORDERED BY NANKING

Secondly, the attitude taken by the Nanking Government must also be said to have considerably embarrassed the position of the leaders of the 29th Army. When the Lukouchiao affair occurred, the Nanking Government telegraphed the 29th Army, advising it to take any, and if necessary forcible measures against the Japanese. Immediately after the outbreak of the trouble the Nanking Government and Army leaders met in conference to discuss the situation. Was the incident premeditated by Japan? Should Japan be fought? Either misdirected by reports from the Chinese sources on the spot or prompted by some ulterior motives, the conclusion was reached that Japan had planned the whole affair. Steps should be taken to meet this situation. It is reported that General Ho Ying-chin, Chief of Staff and General Cheng Chien, vice-Chief of Staff, soldiers of approved experience and knowledge, definitely recommended Chiang Kai-shek to take a course of moderation as the only way of averting the risk of jeopardizing the whole organization of the Chinese Army. Chiang Kai-shek was disposed to temporize as he shared the views of his two chief military advisers. Yet his repeated pledge to fight a foe on Chinese soil had to be fulfilled. The Blue Shirts and the Communists won the day.



So the Central Government, as early as July 9th, issued an order for the northward movement of 4 army divisions under its command. The air force was mobilized and ordered to stand by. Prompt action, however, to be valued from the strategic point of view, may precipitate conflict, or at least aggravate a situation when it is unwarranted. It is hardly understandable that so great an aggregation of armed men should be moved immediately after a minor clash. It means either provocation or hasty judgment.

It will be remembered that meanwhile in Japan a Cabinet meeting had been, as mentioned above, hurriedly called on July 11th when the report of the Chinese troop and air force movements had been known and the decision had been made to take all necessary measures for dispatching military forces to North China. Actual mobilization was, however, deferred several days, because the attempts at a local settlement might prove successful and thus the actual dispatch of troops become unnecessary.

These data, although they may appear immaterial to a cursory observer, are in reality very important for a knowledge of the real facts.

Since then, movements had steadily continued. Central Army troops had been approaching North China along the Peiping-Hankow Railway and on July 22nd entered Hopei Province. The strength of the army in Hopei was estimated to be about 70,000 on July 23rd. These troops were later reported to have started advancing with the forces under General Wan Fu-lin and General Feng Chan-hai, reportedly 30,000 strong, both stationed around Liangsiang, 10 miles south of Lukouchiao.

The total number of Chinese troops concentrated near Changchow approached 130,000. In addition, more than 50,000 were stationed near Hsuechow on the Tientsin-Pukow Railway. There was every evidence that the Central Army had entered the suburbs of Tsinan, and units of the Nanking Military Academy, one of the crack regiments of the Central Army, were reported to have been mobilized. Although no Chinese warplanes have participated so far, preparations for aerial fighting were being rushed.

However, some Nanking leaders were seriously concerned over the sending of a huge army to the North. Dr. H. H. Kung, Finance Minister of the Nanking Government, has been so quoted here for instance. Dr. Kung attended the Coronation ceremony

of King George VI as the representative of his Government and during his stay in London received the news of the outbreak of the North China incident. He immediately sent urgent telegraphic messages to the home Government, advising it to use great caution in meeting the emergency. Due to his great concern over China's situation, Dr. Kung also cabled to Nanking on July 27th, stating that the European Powers, being busily engaged in consolidating their own defenses, had no time to divide their attention to the Far Eastern situation and he earnestly advised the Nanking Administration to make strenuous efforts not to enlarge the possibility of war which would make the solution of the situation impossible. This was wise counsel. Dr. Kung is keenly alive to the prevailing situation in Europe and America and has seemingly found that China's vigorous attitude runs counter to her real interests. Unfortunately, however, his advice was not accepted.

#### NANKING'S REFUSAL TO ACCEPT A LOCAL SETTLEMENT

The stand first taken by Nanking refusing to give any consideration to a local settlement of the affair also had the most unfortunate results.

It must be recalled that Hopei and Chahar Provinces have an entirely different political status from the other provinces of China. Circumstances that led to the establishment of the Hopei-Chahar Political Council make this clear.

North China, as a region in which a large number of Japanese live and in which are bound up vast and vital interests, and especially as a territory contiguous to Manchoukuo, necessarily occupies a special position. The existence there of a régime pursuing openly and actively an anti-Japanese and anti-Manchoukuo-an policy would bring on constant friction and collision, if not war itself, which would be intolerable and ruinous for both Japan and China. The Hopei-Chahar Political Council came into being as the logical outgrowth of such a condition.

After the Manchurian incident the Nanking Government dispatched General Ho Ying-chin, War Minister, to Peiping and established there a branch of the National Military Council. The object was to relieve the confused situation in North China. At the same time the Nanking Government concluded the Tang-

ku Truce Pact with Japan, which was signed by Major-General Yasutsugu Okamura, vice-chief of staff of the Kwantung Army, and General Hsiung Pin, vice-chief of the General Staff of the Nanking Government. Simultaneously, the Peiping Political Council was established by Nanking to execute the provisions of the pact. This council was a branch of the Executive Yuan of Nanking.

The Council co-operated with the Japanese authorities and achieved satisfactory results in administration. Manchoukuo and North China lie adjacent to each other, but had no formal communications and intercourse. Their traffic, communications and trade were restored to normal through co-operation between this council and Japan. Through railway traffic was resumed, the customs services readjusted, rendering trade possible, and postal connections amicably settled at the same time.

The Peiping Political Council also has settled questions concerning the assassination of two Chinese journalists of pro-Japanese leanings on May 2nd and 3rd, 1935, the murder of a Chinese commander of the Peace Preservation Corps at Luan-chow, midway between Shanhaikwan and Tangku, and the wounding of a Japanese gendarme there by paid agents of anti-Japanese bodies on August 4th of the same year.

Further steps were taken for co-operation among Japan, Manchoukuo and China and for eliminating undue interference. Then the council was consolidated into the Hopei-Chahar Political Council on December 18th, 1935, and General Sung Che-yuan, commander of the 29th Army and former chairman of the Chahar Provincial Government, was made the chairman of the new body.

Unlike those of the other provinces of China the new council did not operate under the direct supervision of the Central Government, but was placed under Nanking's supervision through its Political Affairs Committee. As regards the local affairs of North China, the council entered into direct negotiations with the Japanese authorities there. It is thus self-evident that the representation for a settlement of the Lukouchiao incident as a local affair was within the Council's authority, especially as there were no political issues involved.

## NANKING'S EFFORTS TO UPSET THE NORTHERN STATUS

That the Sino-Japanese conflict brings no profit to either country is understood by those who have the two nations' interest and destiny seriously in mind. Why then should the Nanking Government have disliked to solve what had happened as a local affair? The answer may be found in its intention to upset the present status of North China.

As mentioned before, opinions *pro* and *con* were advanced by Government and party leaders in the important conference held on July 8th at Nanking. Some urged that the matter should be solved locally, while others insisted on a solution by arms. The latter were apparently influenced by China's "unification" in recent years and their over-estimation of China's strength, and they believed that the time had now come to change the status of North China.

This tendency had already been visible for some time, and its effects were to be seen in different domains, particularly in Sino-Japanese economic co-operation. For example, plans had ripened to develop the Lungkwan Iron Mine under Sino-Japanese joint management and to build a railway between Tientsin and Shihchiachwang, but sudden interference by the Nanking Government wrecked those plans. Nanking also prohibited the establishment of the Huitung Aviation Corporation under Sino-Japanese management and the opening of a Japan-Manchoukuo-China air mail service. In Tientsin an anti-land sales act was enforced against Japan, imposing severe punishment on Chinese who sold or leased their land to Japanese. Open efforts had also been made to bring about a change in the Hopei-Chahar Council. During last May and June North China was visited officially or unofficially by many lieutenants of General Chiang, such as General Feng Yu-hsiang, vice-president of the Military Affairs Council, General Chiang Tso-pin, former Ambassador to Tokyo, General Lu Chung-lin, Mr. Shih Ching-ting and several others who are well acquainted with the conditions there. The mission common to them was to relegate General Sung to some distant post in order to permit some Nanking agent to occupy the Peiping position and so to reorganize the local government.



## SYMPATHY MISTAKEN FOR WEAKNESS

The new trend of policy apparent in Nanking seems to have been the result of misjudgment of Japan's attitude. The policy of sympathy proclaimed by Foreign Minister Sato; Japan's friendly attitude during the farcical Sian incident, when Chiang Kai-shek was kidnapped by his protégé Marshal Chang Hsueh-liang, former war lord of Manchuria, and later duly returned to Nanking with the kidnapper on his plane; the opinions of Japanese diplomats and military officers lauding Nanking's efforts for unification and reconstruction; all these had led to a demand for "a new view of China." In Japan criticisms were even levelled against the policy of the Tokyo Government on the grounds that it was not fixed on a firm basis. These signs of sympathy China took for weakness, and this led to the over-estimation of her own strength. However, far sighted foreigners had been warning the Chinese of the danger inherent in this attitude toward Japan and the North China question.

The *North China Daily News*, Shanghai, in an editorial on May 22nd, under the title of "Unfortunate Tendencies," said:

At a time when Japanese statesmen have clearly shown their desire to view Chinese affairs by a 'new concept,' it is unfortunate that certain asperities in argument have lately manifested themselves in Chinese comment on Sino-Japanese relationships. It should not be forgotten that in making his pronouncements on the new policy Mr. Naotaké Sato is by no means assured of freedom from criticism. There is still in Japan a powerful section of opinion which watches affairs here with vigilant eyes for signs of intransigence for the better justification of its belief in "positive action" here. The present ebullitions among the students in Peiping must afford considerable satisfaction to Mr. Sato's opponents in Japan. . . . The danger of overcalling a hand is well-known to diplomatists as well as to bridge players. The success of General Chiang Kai-shek in obtaining the recognition of China's equality of status as the result of his unification of the country, will only be prejudiced if the occasion is taken to claim for China a measure of military or political strength unwarranted by the facts. The man who cries before he is out of the wood is apt to receive a nasty shock. So also is he who banks too much on a forbearance which emanates from a sense of strength mistaken by him for weakness.

Mr. Nathaniel Peffer, an American journalist and student of international affairs well versed in the China situation, who had

been studying the most recent course of China's tendencies during his stay there cautioned China to the same effect in the June issue of the *Asia* in an article entitled "China Must not Fight Now."

Space prevents us from reproducing his article here *in toto*, but the introductory note by Mr. Richard J. Walsh, the editor, who is responsible for having published Mr. Peffer's article, may be usefully reprinted. It said:

This article, written in Shanghai early in April, is a warning based upon the author's recent observations in both China and Japan. His fear is that over-confidence bred by the recent "moral victory" over Japan may lead China to a reckless use of force which might be disastrous for her.

That our readers may better judge the bases of this warning we summarize below the events just before and since the article was written:

During March the threat of further Japanese military movements in Inner Mongolia ceased and Japanese troops were withdrawn from Suiyuan.

At Peiping a Japanese spokesman said that Japan might soon be ready to discuss a formula for restoring Chinese control in North China.

At Tokyo Foreign Minister Sato said that China's wish to be treated on an equal footing "should be respected and past differences forgotten." A council called by the Tokyo Chamber of Commerce formally declared that it was useless to press further in North China, and that economic co-operation was impossible unless political differences were solved. Finance Minister Yuki said, in the election campaign, "Japan's economic policy cannot stand without regard to China. The Army understands this point now and agrees that economic co-operation in China is essential. We propose to go ahead with it."

Meanwhile the Central Government of China made further progress toward unification. Pressure from Nanking brought more co-operation from Sung Che-yuan, chairman of the Hopei-Chahar Council.

Smuggling by Japanese and Koreans, which had been a severe point of irritation in North China, was brought further under control by the Chinese.

A new National Defense Council was formed under Chiang Kai-shek. It was reported that this council would include General Feng Yu-hsiang, General Ho Ying-chin, and General Pain Chung-hsi, and that Pai would succeed Ho as War Minister. This would be especially significant because General Pai is one of the two Kwangsi leaders who started the rebellion in the South a year ago, intended to force a declaration of war against Japan.

A congress representing 200,000 young Communists formed the

No thwest Youth Association as the basis of a nation-wide organization prepared to fight Japan, and telegraphed to the Central Government a renewed offer of Communist co-operation.

The total effect of the past two months was such as to inspire in China the over-confidence which Mr. Pepper finds to be so dangerous for China herself at the present moment.

R. J. W.

From Mr. Pepper's article we will only extract a few sentences :

What needs most to be said about China now is that the Chinese are very close to losing their balance. If they do not pull themselves up, they will repeat the mistake they made almost ten years ago, with the same disastrous consequences. In fact, it is difficult just now to say which China has more to fear : Japan or China, the ambitions of the Japanese Army or the state of mind of the Chinese people. The latter, I am inclined to think. For it may succeed in bringing on a war that is not easy to prevent in any case but that could still be prevented. . . .

(China) won a great moral victory last autumn. It stood off Japan by sheer force of will. But the victory has borne an over-confidence, a recklessness and an impatience to exploit the victory that may very well bring on that which the Chinese have had most reason to dread till now—a formal attempt by Japan to conquer the country by force. What began as a resignation to war if necessary, as a last resort, in self-preservation, is now in a fair way to becoming a will to war. One has only to be here in China for forty-eight hours to be shocked by the recklessness with which not only students but mature and influential Chinese talk and think of war.

## FUNDAMENTAL ISSUES IN SINO-JAPANESE RELATIONS

### WHO RULES CHINA?

We must, however, go deeper to find the real reasons behind the present developments of Chinese policy. These facts do not shed sufficiently satisfactory light on the underlying impulses and motives that have guided China. For that, we must find out the hidden force that is leading China.

Let us go back two and a half decades to the birth of the present régime. The revolutionary dreamer, Sun Yat-sen, pushed over the tottering structure of the Chinese Empire. He proclaimed the People's Three Principles, and in their name he demanded the abolition of unequal treaties, of foreign rights acquired allegedly by conquest. An age of chaotic civil wars followed. The Chinese National Party had to cope with powerful war lords and barely extended its rule over a part of Canton. But a new power arose. The Bolshevik party ruled the millions of the old Russian Empire. From the Kremlin spread a campaign to bolshevize the world. And Moscow's help was extended to the Kuomintang.

With the aid of Russian men and money, the Canton Revolutionary Government waged an economic war on British Imperialism, holding Hongkong by the throat. Then, under the leadership of the cadets from Colonel Chiang Kai-shek's Whampoa Military Academy, the revolutionary armies swept to the north to stop at Hankow. There a split occurred ; Chiang Kai-shek broke away from the left wing of the party and his Communist advisers. The Nationalist Party set out to conquer China.

Ten years have elapsed since those hectic days. Under the slogans of "Down with Imperialism!" and "Scrap the unequal treaties!" the Kuomintang has fought its way to power, uniting the people in a common hatred of the "foreign imperialists."

Fierce hate against them was the common link between the peoples of different languages and customs of the South, the



Central Provinces and the North. British and American "imperialism" was attacked and boycotts declared. Students were killed on Nanking Road in the Shanghai Settlement. American women were attacked in Nanking. Great Britain abandoned her concessions in Hankow and Kiukiang.

Then the Kuomintang turned on Japan. From 1915 to 1931 seven boycotts were declared. The Nationalist flag was hoisted in Manchuria, where Japan had vital interests for which she had already staked her existence in two wars in 1894 and 1905. Kuomintang agitation began there too, menacing Japan's legitimate interests. Nippon's diplomats, pursuing the policy which had prompted the Washington agreements, made to help China to her feet and exerted utmost forbearance and amity. But the Kuomintang pursued its "revolutionary policy"—the unilateral abrogation of unpleasant agreements and the forceful capture of legitimate interests. Japan could bear no more. And in September, 1931, the Manchurian affair broke out.

#### THE BLUE SHIRTS

It was after this affair that the most formidable political power in China came into being.

In reaction against the corruption which was spreading in the victorious Nationalist Party, a group of young officers, graduates from the Whampoa Military Academy in Canton, organized a secret society in order to carry out the ideals of the Revolution: war against imperialism, abrogation of unequal treaties and destruction of the military caste. The leadership they offered to their former director at the Academy, Chiang Kai-shek.

This movement responded to the latter's ideals as well as to his ambition. In the party he held but a lower rank, compared with the veteran politicians of the Revolution. His dream of reaching the pinnacle seemed hardly realizable. As head of this new organisation he could wield a power which, as a member of the Kuomintang, was beyond his grasp. So General Chiang gladly accepted the offer of his old pupils and subordinates and started to build a fascist party—the mightiest weapon of power that China, the land of secret societies, has known since the days of the Taiping.

The Blue Shirts, as the society is known although it has no

official name, today really rule China. Their nucleus is formed of some thirty-four men, all save one graduates of Whampoa. These men, active, devoted to their ideals and their chief, hold key positions in the party, the Administration and the Army. The commanders of Chiang's crack "personal" divisions are Blue Shirts; the spiritual guidance of the armed forces is in the hands of Chiang's personal representatives, among them Ho Chung-han.<sup>1</sup> Money they have too, either derived from their positions or supplied by the opium transit dues, which are levied by Chiang's men and go directly into his war chest.

The membership of the society now totals about 10,000, though it aims at 2 million. But these ten thousand are the pick of the nation, for Chiang will admit only those who are willing to become soldiers, to work and suffer, obey and sacrifice, never seeking official position or personal privileges, and are able to labor at least 12 hours a day. And also an oath is taken always to fight Japan bitterly by all and any means. In fact anti-foreignism—what the Kuomintang called the "Revolutionary policy"—has always been a weapon of internal politics in faction-ridden China. It is not to be wondered that the Blue Shirts seized on this—certain to win popular support—but this time with Japan as its object.

This is one of the hidden powers that Japan has to face in China. It has been working up the tide of antagonism all over the country through the official sections of the Kuomintang and the countless secret societies which are in existence. This activity was the reason why Japan demanded in 1935 the withdrawal

1 In the Party and Administration: Ho Chung-han, director of the Bureau of Political Training of Military Council; Kan Tse, Chief of the so-called "G. P. U." of the Nationalist Party; Liu Chien-chun, one of the directors of the Canton Military Council; Teng Wen-i, director of the cultural activities of the Blue Shirts, military attaché of the Chinese Embassy in Soviet Russia; Tseng Kuo-ching, member of the Central Executive Committee; Fêng Ti, Military attaché of the Chinese Embassy in Germany; Pan Yu-chiang, of the Division of National Military Education; the most dreaded Tai Li, commander of the detachment specializing in assassination.

(In the Army) Army and Division Commanders: Hu Tsung-nan (1st Army and 1st Div.), Huang Chieh (Commander of 2nd Army and 2nd Division) also general commander of the Customs Police, Kuan Lin-cheng (17th Army and 25th Div.), Tang En-po (13th Army), Li Mo-an (10th Div.), Yü Chi-shih (ex. 87th Div.), Sun Yüan-liang (88th Div.). The air force and gendarmerie are as a matter of course under direct Blue Shirt influence. Tsai Tsin-chün, chief of police of Shanghai and Chi Chang-chien, chief of the Peace Preservation Corps of Shanghai, are also members of the society.

from North China of all Blue Shirt organizations. With their retreat, productive co-operation was again made possible.

#### THE BLUE SHIRTS' ALLIES: THE COMMUNISTS

The Blue Shirts in their campaign against Japan were to have been helped by an ally whom until recently they openly fought. This is the Communist Party.

In 1935, at the Seventh World Congress of the Comintern held at Moscow, a new line of action was set. Attempts at direct revolution in the European countries were to be abandoned for the moment, as they had provoked strong reaction. The masses were to be won with the help of the Second International, and the Communists were to rally the socialists and radicals to their side and form a People's Front, then take the leadership of government. In another resolution passed at the Congress, Poland and Japan were singled out as countries against which efforts were to be specially directed.

The success reaped by the People's Front policy has been seen in France and Spain.

In China, following Moscow's orders, the Communists made a skilful move. Cleverly taking advantage of the prevailing anti-Japanese sentiment, which the Blue Shirts had already done so much to intensify, they attempted to take the leadership of the campaign, and under the slogan of "Fight Japan!" to build a People's Front and renew the alliance of 1927 between the Communists Party and the Kuomintang.

The feud between the Blue Shirts and Communists subsided—temporarily at least. Sun Yat-sen's widow, who lives in Shanghai, told friends she now dared to go out of the French Concession, as she no longer feared assassination by the Blue Shirts.

These were the allies that the Blue Shirts found particularly active in North China when they secretly filtered in again some months ago. Since that time order has again been disturbed, the fruitful and harmonious co-operation between Chinese and Japanese destroyed. Resentment and hate have been fanned into flame. And one day shooting broke out at Lukouchiao.

#### THE FORCES JAPAN HAS TO FACE

Such is the situation Japan has to cope with in China. Anti-

Japanese sentiment is being kindled and cultivated as a matter of policy. Whether this sentiment itself is justified or not is beside the question. Wilful excitation against any country certainly is not in the interest of humanity. It certainly has made relations between the two peoples born to be friendly neighbors bitter in an unbelievable degree, bringing with it a train of sorrow and hardships. There lies the fundamental problem in the relationship between China and Japan. Will the leaders of China keep pursuing, for reasons of internal expediency or of national intent, a consistent policy of hatred against Japan? Reaction follows action. One clash leads to a counter clash. It is the privilege and the duty of statesmen to stop, even at a sacrifice of so-called "national pride" or personal disadvantage, the lumbering march of nations to disaster.

#### WHAT JAPAN WANTS: CO-OPERATION, NOT TERRITORY

Premier Konoyé declared, on July 27th, in the 71st special Diet session that what Japan wanted of China was not her territory, but her co-operation. Even the most nationalistic elements in Japan reject the idea of conquering China with her 400,000,000 recalcitrant people as utterly foolish. Not even a single voice urging anything resembling the conquest of North China has ever been heard in Japan. Such a demand would run against the policy of the Japanese Government and would not merit even casual attention.

Japan at heart sympathizes with China's cardinal national policy of internal unification and reconstruction of the country on a unified basis. However, Japan is opposed to a policy of co-operation with the Comintern or a People's Front, as its only and natural result is to disturb the peace of the Far East and the international relations of this part of the world.

May the Chinese people take a true and realistic view of their country's position in the world and seriously set themselves to the task of their country's unification and reconstruction primarily by their own initiative and effort. World sympathy—and particularly Japan's—is theirs. But let them not be made to believe that a wilful policy of hate and contempt towards any Power will heighten the esteem in which their constructive efforts are held.



If China is really awake to this, the present crisis can pave the way toward Sino-Japanese reconciliation and co-operation, and so prove to be a worthy contribution to peace in the Far East and in the world. Then the heavy price paid by the two countries and the sacrifices they have made will not have been in vain.

## APPENDICES

### CHINESE FORCES IN HOPEI PROVINCE BEFORE AND AFTER THE INCIDENT (AS OF JULY 21st)

	Before incident	July 21st	Increase
Central Army (under direct control of Chiang Kai-shek)			
{ Liu Chih Army	0	17,000	17,000
{ Li Mo-an Army			
Central Army (under indirect control)			
{ Shang Chen Army	7,000	58,000	51,000
{ Pang Ping-hsun Army			
Local Armies			
{ Sun Che-yuan Army	57,000	59,000	2,000
{ Wan Fu-lin Army	16,000	16,000	
{ Feng Chan-hai Army	15,000	15,000	
Total	95,000	165,000	70,000

### STATEMENT OF SIR AUSTIN CHAMBERLAIN IN THE HOUSE OF COMMONS, MARCH 30, 1927

I am in a position to supplement my statement of the other day by facts derived in part, directly from British sources and, in part, from information supplied to His Majesty's Minister in Peking by American and Japanese representatives. The looting was carried out by soldiers in uniform belonging to formations under the command of General Cheng Chien . . . Foreign women, including Mrs. Giles, the wife of His Majesty's Consul-General, were thoroughly searched and rudely stripped of valuables. Many had their clothes torn off them, and two American women were saved from attempted violation. These facts can be established by sworn depositions. . . .

### SWORN STATEMENT BY MRS. GILES, THE WIFE OF THE BRITISH CONSUL-GENERAL AT NANKING, ISSUED AS A BRITISH FOREIGN OFFICE PAPER, MARCH 30, 1927

. . . Three soldiers at once seized me, tore rings off my fingers, inflicting considerable pain, and snatched brooch in my dress and chain from the neck,

also watch and bracelet from the wrist. They took shoes from my feet and felt to see if there was anything in my stocking. They treated me with great brutality. Mrs. Robert and Miss Blake were treated in the same manner. . . . At one time men came in with executioner's sword, and held it within an inch of my husband's throat. Another man brandished a carving knife. Others attempted to tear clothes from myself and other ladies in the party. . . .

#### STATEMENT REGARDING THE NANKING OUTRAGE

March 24, 1926

In order that the American public may know the facts regarding the Nanking outrage, we, the undersigned American citizens and residents of Nanking who were present when the outrages against foreign lives and property were committed in that city on March 24th, desire to make a public statement. Out of our own first hand experience and observation we unequivocally affirm that these outrages were committed by armed Nationalist soldiers in uniform who acted with the knowledge and approval of their superior officers. These outrages consisted not only in the looting of foreign homes, consular offices, schools, hospitals and places of business, but also in the burning of foreign homes and schools; in deliberate murder; in twice shooting and seriously wounding a young American woman; in shooting at and attempting to kill foreign men, women and children; in the attempted rape of American women; and in other shocking indignities to foreign women too indecent to be published. To many of such we can bear the sworn testimony of eye-witnesses; and numerous other cases have been proven beyond the least shadow of doubt. From the statements of many of the Nationalist soldiers made to us and from the testimony of Chinese friends, it is an established fact that they entered Nanking with definite license, if not instructions, to rob and kill foreigners. From the actions of the troops it was evident that their plan was to loot foreign buildings, force the occupants to disclose the location of their valuables, strip them of their clothing, and maltreat them at will. Some of us were told both by these soldiers themselves and also by Chinese friends who helped us to find places of concealment, that we should surely be killed. It is our conviction that the firing from the naval vessels prevented the murder of many foreigners who were caught in the city. It was immediately after the shelling was begun by American and British ships that bugles were sounded and the soldiers ceased their systematic work of destruction, thus demonstrating that they were under the control of higher military officers. These are all incontrovertible facts.

It now seems well established, in the opinion of both Chinese and for-

eigners, that those responsible for these outrages are of the Communist wing of the Nationalist Government which is dominated and directed by Russian Bolshevik advisers. They are the enemies not only of foreign interests in China but also of China's truest welfare, and it is our belief that unless checked they will make impossible the realization of an orderly and unified Government. We have always been in deepest sympathy with genuine Chinese national aims, and in spite of the fearful experience through which we have passed, we maintain this sympathy. For this reason we are appalled as we think of the inevitable consequences to China and to the world, if the destructive influences which are now determining the policy of the Nationalist Government are not restrained.

(Signed) A. J. Bowen, LL.D., Methodist Episcopal Mission, and President of Nanking University.  
P. F. Price, D.D., Southern Presbyterian Mission.  
Donald W. Richardson, Southern Presbyterian Mission.  
W. R. Williams, Friends Mission.  
C. A. Matti, Friends Mission.  
John H. Reisner, Northern Presbyterian Mission.  
J. C. Thomson, Northern Presbyterian Mission.  
C. Stanley Smith, Northern Presbyterian Mission.  
Harry Clemons, Northern Presbyterian Mission.  
G. W. Loos, Jr., Northern Presbyterian Mission.  
L. J. Owen, Treasurer of University of Nanking.  
Edwin Marx, Disciples of Christ Mission.  
L. B. Ridgely, D.D., American Episcopal Mission.  
W. P. Roberts, American Episcopal Mission.  
J. G. Mager, American Episcopal Mission.  
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
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
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
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






Position of Chinese Armies

(July 16, 1937)



POSITION OF CHINESE ARMIES, AUGUST 3, 1937

